

UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA

**AN INVESTIGATION INTO CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN
GHANA: A CASE OF GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY.**

ZENAS DON-ADDA

**MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION IN PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY
CHAIN MANAGEMENT**



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GHANA: A CASE OF GHANA HIGHWAY AUTHORITY.**



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School of Business, submitted to the school of
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of the requirements for the award of the degree of
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DECLARATION

Student's Declaration

I, the undersigned declares that this research project, with the exception of quotations and references contained in published works that have all been identified and duly acknowledged, is entirely my original work, and it has not been submitted either in part or in whole for another degree in this University or elsewhere.

Student Name	Index Number	Signature	Date
Zenas Don-Adda	220000180



Supervisor's Certification

I hereby certify that this research work was supervised following the guidelines of dissertation supervision laid down by the University.

Supervisor's Name	Signature	Date
Dr. Mawuko Dza

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family.



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ABSTRACT

Government or public institutions spend public funds on the provision of essential services like health, education, defence and infrastructure. However, while ensuring that public funds are utilized judiciously, there are corrupt acts that prevail in the process. Therefore, this study aimed to ascertain the effects of these corrupt acts on the public procurement process. Simple random sampling was used to obtain thirty-three (33) respondents from Ghana Highway Authority, Accra and a quantitative study was employed to solicit their perceptions on the topic. It was found that undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest are the main corrupt practices perpetrated in public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority. Also, the study revealed that these corrupt acts are mostly fuelled by the level of remuneration of public officials and lack of transparency in the process. Additionally, the findings revealed that corruption has a strong effect on public procurement, therefore, encouraging inefficiencies like delivery delays and increased contract value. In conclusion, the study recommends that the management of Ghana Highway Authority should introduce random transfer or rotation of staff, especially those involved in procurement processes of the organization. There should be public prosecution of offenders to serve as a deterrent.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Corruption in the public sector has necessitated concerted efforts to fight it by organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. The prevalent view is that corruption undermines democratization, the rule of law, the consolidation of market economies, and is a threat to the international economy (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

There is no globally accepted definition of corruption, but generally, it can be said to be the misuse of power entrusted to a person for personal gains. Depending on the intended dimension, form, type or degree the term corruption has been used to describe various incidence of waywardness affecting life in several spheres, manifesting itself in social, economic, business and public relations. It has found different expressions among cultures, nations and disciplines such that different cultures and societies may perceive corruption in different ways (Samura, 2009). Mould-Iddrisu (2010) describes corruption as any act, “irregular, unethical, immoral or illegal” that enables individuals or groups to take undue advantage of their positions or relationships against the rights and interest of others. According to the Ut stein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, corruption is a phenomenon that is multi-faceted: it is diverse and complex in terms of actors, initiators, profiteers, causes and consequences.

Corruption is disastrous to the sound functioning of any institution. Corruption has been an intractable problem in many developing countries; especially where it has become systematic to the point where many in government have a stake. It diverts decision-making and the provision

of services from those who need them to those who can afford them (Langseth, Kato, Kisubi & Pope, 1997). The problem of poor governance and corruption remains one of the main obstacles to economic development (Shah, 2012). Considerable research has been done on corruption and economic growth; findings show that corruption is a major obstacle to economic development (Nyambariga, 2016). The effects of corruption on the economy can be severe, including misallocation of scarce resources, reduction in the quality of services, increased cost of doing business, discouraging foreign investments as well as shrinking governments' tax revenues. It is estimated that African countries lose billions of dollars per annum in corruption (Mauro, 1997).

The key function of any government is the provision of essential services to its citizens. These services include health, education, defence and infrastructure, and these services are provided through procurement. Procurement plays significant role in ensuring effective control and supply of inputs that are important for all levels of establishment (Nyambariga, 2016). According to Arrowsmith (2005), Public procurement is the purchasing by a government, of the goods and services it requires to function and maximize public welfare. In doing so, a government will often adopt regulation and procedures to ensure that it obtains these goods, services or 'works' (construction contracts) in a transparent, competitive manner and at the most economically advantageous price.

As part of the efforts to adopt a long term and strategic view of their procurement needs and management, most countries have resorted to turning to their annual procurement plans as a possible 'problem-solver' since public procurement is believed to be one of the primary areas where corruption takes place. Also, public procurement is increasingly recognized as a profession that plays a significant role in the successful management of public resources and a number of countries have also become more aware of the importance of procurement as an area

vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption, and have thus instituted efforts to integrate procurement in a more strategic view of government efforts (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007).

Corruption takes place in public and private sectors, where officials improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position for which they are placed (Asian Development Bank, 2003). When this unlawful and improper behaviour is applied to the public acquisition process, it becomes public procurement corruption. It essentially entails deliberate failure to follow the expected minimum standard behaviour in managing the acquisition process by government agencies and departments. Corruption takes place once the procurement laws and regulations are broken for the benefit of an individual or group of individuals against the public interest and need of internal customers (Kato, 2011). In public procurement, the perpetrators of corruption, normally participants in the system either as contractors or employees of the procurement entity, exploit their position, role, influence, power or authority in the organization or in a particular situation to wrongfully and unlawfully obtain benefits for themselves or other persons, as opposed to their duty to their employer and/or their responsibility to others (Wells, 2004). The definition of procurement corruption includes the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting; directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution (World Bank, 2004). A broad definition of public sector corruption is the abuse of authority by bureaucratic officials who exploit their powers of discretion, delegated to them by the government, to further their own interests by engaging in illegal, or unauthorized, rent-seeking activities (Blackburn, Bose, & Haque, 2005).

Every year, there are numerous public procurement corruption that prevails in various countries, and these diverse corrupt practices are revealed by audit reports from both local and international bodies like World Bank, OECD, UN etc. In Ghana, a 2002 internal audit report revealed significant procurement irregularities at Korle-Bu, Ghana's premier teaching hospital. The largest discrepancies were found in the procurement processes of the Supplies Department, the director of which allegedly ordered a 17-year supply of 'Post-Operative Charts'. The quantity was said to last until 2019, but this type of chart was globally banned in 1989, at least 10 years before the purchase took place. In 1999, 190,000 of these charts were ordered, and despite the excess supply and the obsolete nature of the charts, a further 50,000 were ordered the following year. Additional obsolete items were also said to be purchased in excessive quantities. In the report, it further emerged that purchase requisitions were not used as a part of the procurement process and no maximum or minimum levels of stock were identified, meaning that stocks were purchased arbitrarily. Meanwhile a severe shortage of essential medicines prevailed than has been planned efficiently in the budget (Kato, 2011).

Data from the Auditor General's department indicates that there have been a lot of discrepancies in public procurement proceedings. According to the report on audit of COVID-19 transactions for the period March 2020 to June 2022, it was unravelled that the Ministry of Health on behalf of Government of Ghana paid an amount of US\$120,192,379.80 to UNICEF/AVAT for the supply of vaccines. However, 5,109,600.00 doses of vaccines valued at US\$38,322,000.00 were supplied to the National Cold Room leaving a difference of US\$81,870,379.80 with UNICEF/AVAT. The remaining doses of vaccines are yet to be delivered but full payment has already been made by the ministry. Also, from the same report, the Ministry of Health, without

the approval of the Central Tender Review Committee, increased the cost of five contracts with total contract sum of GH¢24,256,500.00 by GH¢4,017,000.00 through variation orders.

Over the years, corruption in public procurement has been on the rise and there are numerous evidences for most of these infractions. In Ghana, corruption in public procurement has been a subject of interest for most stakeholders including Civil Society Organizations, Diplomatic missions and embassies, as well as citizens. This study points out most of these corrupt acts, their causes and how they influence public procurement.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Ghana, procurement accounts for over fifty percent of public spending, of which about one-third is lost through corruption (Public Procurement Authority: Electronic Bulletin, 2013). This makes public procurement an area which is hugely affected by corruption. It has been estimated that as much as 10% of the total expenditure on infrastructural projects is committed annually to bribery and corruption in Ghana (Short, 2010). The Auditor General's report of 2016 revealed that, stores and procurement irregularities during the period amounted to GH¢35,940,445.43. These irregularities according to the report were mainly as a result of failure on the part of staff to follow procurement procedures prescribed in the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) as amended. These breaches include; failure to obtain the required numbers of quotations, contract splitting and exceeding authorized thresholds (Dza, Kyeremeh, Dzandu, & Affran, 2018). Inability to obtain required number of quotations will always make the procurement process uncompetitive and cost inefficient. In many OECD countries, significant corruption risks arise from conflict of interest in decision-making, which may distort the allocation of resources through public procurement (European Commission, 2014). The 2006 World Bank-IFC survey indicates that close to half of the firms questioned expect to give a gift to secure a government

contract. The process of bidding involves other intermediaries such as joint venture companies and private companies who may facilitate corruption by compromising to the illegal acquisition of funds (Transparency International, *Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement*, 2006). This is one of the most common corrupt acts seen in public procurement. Usually, it is the persons who work within the procurement unit who are susceptible to these gifts. The givers of the gifts mostly do it with their intention to establish a strong bond with that particular staff in return for favours when the tenders are being evaluated and finally contracts are awarded.

Public procurement processes in Ghana must be governed by a particular law, which is the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. This law has gone through a lot of reforms until its present state. It started from the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) which was launched in 1996 to improve overall public financial management in Ghana. This programme identified certain weaknesses in the public procurement system, hence the Public Procurement Oversight Group (PPOG) was established in 1999 to steer the development of a comprehensive public procurement reform programme. This group drafted the Public Procurement bill in 2002 and the next year it was passed into law as the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) as amended. This law brought a certain level of structure and order in public procurement in Ghana. Notwithstanding, in 2016, the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) was amended to incorporate current international best practices, to correct the major weaknesses identified in the principal enactment and other inaccuracies found. In addition to the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) as amended, there is another legal document called Public Procurement Manual which serves as a guide for procurement entities in their public spending in accordance with the Act. Also, the Public Procurement Authority was established to oversee the full implementation of the Public Procurement Act (Act 663) as amended.

Over the years, there have been a lot of research works done on ensuring sanity in the spending of public funds by state owned enterprises. The research work done by Dza, Kyeremeh, Dzandu, and Afran (2018), with focus on Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) across the country, revealed widespread corruption in the public service of Ghana. Notable procurement related corrupt practices unravelled included influence peddling, inflating contract sums, payment for non-existing contracts, deliberate contract splitting, multiple payments for contracts, use of phantom vendors and misapplication of public funds. The study further noted that some principal officers such as Coordinating Directors, Finance Officers, Budget and Planning officers, Engineers, Internal Auditors, Stores and Procurement officers, as well as government representatives misappropriate funds meant for development projects in their catchment areas, while staff looked on unconcerned. Essentially, some employees see nothing wrong with their principal officers and other colleagues indulging in acts of corruption, their reason being that they might do same when they assume similar positions in future (Dza, Kyeremeh, Dzandu, and Afran, 2018).

Akomah and Nani (2016) argue that greed and weaknesses in institutional structures, and failure to implement and enforce policies and laws are the most important causes of corruption in public procurement, with systematic corruption being the most widespread type of corruption. Ameyaw and Mensah (2013) confirmed in their study, the perceptions of procurement professionals; specifically practicing quantity surveyors on the existence of corruption in the procurement process, and also established that it is prevalent at the tender evaluation stage of the procurement process.

However, although research has been carried out on corruption in public procurement in the public sector of Ghana, there needs to be more research on that with respect to Ghana Highway Authority, therefore the researcher's desire or motivation to undertake this study.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to investigate corrupt practices and how they affect the public procurement processes, with emphasis on Ghana Highway Authority (GHA).

The specific objectives are to:

- i. Identify perceived corrupt practices that take place in public procurement in GHA
- ii. Ascertain causes of corruption in public procurement in GHA
- iii. Ascertain out the effects of these corrupt acts in public procurement in GHA

1.4 Research Questions

This study is guided by the following research questions:

- i. What are the corrupt practices that take place in public procurement in GHA?
- ii. What are the causes of these corrupt practices in public procurement in GHA?
- iii. What are the effects of these corrupt acts in public procurement in GHA?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study sought to improve the understanding of public procurement practices and serve as a reference material for students and lecturers in the field. This arouses their interest for further research on public procurement issues, in order to unravel new ideas.

Again, the study ensured sensitization of roles and responsibilities by procurement practitioners and officers in ministries, departments and agencies related to procurement operations, for instance; contracts committee, evaluation committees and accounting officers.

The study helped policy makers in designing appropriate policies that ensures awareness of public procurement practices.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study is to investigate corrupt practices and how they affect the public procurement processes, with emphasis on Ghana Highway Authority (GHA). This study focused on employees in the procurement, administration and account/finance units in Ghana Highway Authority, especially those stationed in the head office. The study was undertaken within a period of eight months, in order to come out with an in-depth knowledge on how corruption affects public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the head office of Ghana Highway Authority in the Accra metropolis. A study of this nature could have been carried out in the entire Winneba, Tamale, Kumasi and other Metropolis but for the sake of proximity and revenue constraint, it was limited to the head office in Accra.

1.8 Overview of Research Methodology

This study utilizes descriptive research design to identify, analyse and describe the influence of corruption in public procurement procedures in Ghana Highway Authority. It looks at conditions or relationships that exist, practices that prevail, beliefs, point of view, or attitudes that are held, processes that are going on, effects that are being felt or trends that are developing (Manoharan,

2009). This research employed quantitative approach to collect data which was measured in numerical figures.

The study sampled forty employees from the procurement, auditing, accounts/finance and administration departments of the Ghana Highway Authority head office. Casual and contract employees were not included since they have an unstable engagement period with the institution, hence might not be privy to certain information.

Data was collected from respondents who were conveniently available to participate in the study. The study utilizes questionnaire as the data collection instrument. The choice of this data collection instrument is because it is convenient to use, inexpensive and provides anonymity for the respondents especially in the public sector where information is highly sensitive and structured to suit specific types of information sought by a researcher (Gatara, 2010).

The Statistical Product for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse collected data from respondents, in order to come up with clear results. Within the SPSS, descriptive statistics, in the form of frequencies and percentages were applied in data analysis.

1.9 Organization of the Study

This study is grouped under five chapters, each of which presents specific details on the topic of the research. Chapter One is the introductory chapter of the study and it contains background and general concepts, statement of the problem, research objectives and research questions, significance and limitations of the study and general layout of the of the dissertation. Chapter Two centres on literature necessary for the study, which reviews relevant literature on the research area and identifies gaps in the literature in which the study attempts to fill. Chapter Three captures methodology of the study which includes research design, population and sample, method of data collection and analysis whiles Chapter Four also presents and explains the results

and discusses the findings of the study. Chapter five is the summary chapter of the study, which itemizes the major research findings and how it contributes to knowledge, and also makes recommendations or suggestions for future research work.



CHAPTER TWO


LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to review various studies and literatures published by researchers, pertaining to the causes and different forms of corruption and how they affect public procurement. In other words, the conduct of empirical, theoretical and conceptual reviews of literatures. The review of literatures on corruption and public procurement is to have a broader understanding of their concepts and theories in relation to the objectives of the study.

2.1 Conceptual Review

This section reviews the concepts of corruption and its categories in public procurement processes.



2.1.1 Corruption

Public procurement accounts for a significant amount of government spending: the OECD estimates that countries spend an average of 13 to 20 per cent of their GDPs on procurement (Transparency International, 2014).

One of the most corruption prone government activities is public procurement. The reasons for this include "the volume of transactions and the financial interests at stake" as well as "the complexity of the process, the close interaction between public officials and businesses, and the multitude of stakeholders" (OECD, 2016). In some countries, abuse of the government-spending process "has become the gateway to fortune" (Salisu, 2000). Corruption in public procurement can be a problem in both developed and developing countries, although some forms of

corruption are more prevalent in certain countries, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013a). The OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014) provides additional evidence that public procurement is vulnerable to corruption and also highlights that 57 per cent of all foreign bribery cases are due to procurement corruption.

Tanzi (1998) observes that the negative economic and social costs of corrupt actions, in terms of wasted resources, inefficiency and missed opportunities, are always higher than the benefits that could be obtained through such actions. Dante placed bribers at the bottom of Hell, demonstrating thereby the negative attitude to corrupt behaviour (Tanzi, 1998). Although corruption has been defined in many different ways, there is no generally accepted definition that applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption. In most cases, observers need to agree on whether certain behaviour constitutes corruption. Unfortunately, the behaviour is often difficult to observe because acts of corruption do not typically take place in broad daylight (Tanzi, 1998).

Difficulties in arriving at a common definition of corruption are rooted in legal and political considerations, as well as in varying attitudes and customs in different cultures. For example, gift-giving in many village traditions is not considered as corruption, since the transaction is not made “...under the table...” It is open and transparent; the scale is not life-changing; the benefits are usually shared within the community; and no public rights are violated. In fact, corruption should not be about “...putting one’s fingers in the till but more about the abuse of power or improbability in the decision-making process...” (Klitgaard, 1988, pg. 75). This issue of definition is amplified and compounded by the fact that, in many circles, corruption is so ingrained in daily exchanges that it is tolerated, and accepted to be normal behaviour, e.g.: “...greasing the wheels of business...”. Given the insidious nature of corruption, people have become inured (or blasé) thereto, and this culminates in the existence of “agents” that serve as

liaison with decision-makers. Thus, it is the need to modify attitudes that could present the most difficulty in the combat against corruption, especially, in poor countries, which, at any rate, possess a low forensic capacity to detect corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Rose-Ackerman & Soreide, 2011).

Corruption hinders the establishment of democratic institutions by contorting electoral procedures, distorting the control of law and making bureaucratic foundations whose reason behind existing is the coercing of bribes (Nyambariga, 2016). Economic growth is hindered on the grounds that foreign direct venture is discouraged and independent businesses inside the nation frequently think that it is difficult to overcome the "start-up costs" required (Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983).

2.1.2 Categories of Corruption in Public Procurement

Heidenheimer (1989) categorized corruption into three forms. Firstly, public-office centred corruption is behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role due to private regarding pecuniary or status gains. The second form is market centred corruption where a corrupt civil servant regards his/her public office as a separate business and seeks to maximize his/her income. Thirdly, is the public-centred corruption where its patterns can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions, which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage the public interests. However, from the wider community of business, commerce and industry, these forms of corruption during public procurement proceedings in public sectors can be further explained in the following forms;

Bribery: is the practice of offering/giving someone usually money or other goods in order to gain undeserving advantage in return. Both giving a bribe and taking a bribe is considered to be corruption. Bribery is also known as kickbacks, baksheesh, sweeteners and grease money (Lindgreen, 2004).

Extortion: is the act of coercing someone by threats, or abuse of authority, to give something valuable, such as money, information, excessive interest, or the like. This practice is very similar to bribery; the only difference here is the money is extracted with more violence (Lindgren, 1993). For example, asking money from suppliers as bribe.

Favouritism: is where those in power show favour to their relatives or close friends, i.e., giving them jobs/privileges/pay raise, etc. regardless of their abilities. A very prevalent form of this practice is nepotism. Nepotism is an even narrower form of favouritism. Coming from the Italian word for nephew, it covers favouritism to members of the family (Nadler & Schulman, 2006). “Cronyism is a more specific form of favouritism, referring to partiality towards friends and associates. As the old saying goes, It's not what you know but who you know, or, as blogger Danny Ferguson put it, It's not what you don't know; it's who your college roommate knows. Cronyism occurs within a network of insiders who confer favours on one another” (Nadler & Schulman, 2006).

Embezzlement: is where funds or property owned by someone/institution is misappropriated by the person whose care it has been entrusted. In simple terms, it is theft of public resources by public officials (Purpura, 2013). CHRAJ explains it as when a person holding office in an institution, organization or company dishonestly and illegally appropriates, uses or traffics the funds and goods that have been entrusted upon them for personal enrichment or for other private

purposes, For example, funds budgeted for construction cannot be accounted for at the end of a particular period. The funds can be said to be misappropriated due to corruption.

Fraud: this is a form of corruption which involves the use of deceit for a person's enrichment. An economic crime involving deceit, trickery or false pretence by which someone gains unlawfully (The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre). The victims of this practice are mostly deceived by the culprits with fake materials used as baits. Fraud is sometimes referred to as swindle, double-dealing or cheating. In recent times, some forms of fraud have emerged and are known in Ghanaian parlance as "sakawa" and "419" (CHRAJ-Ghana National Anti-Corruption Action Plan).

In the article, Tender crime, Mulinde Musoke speculated that corruption is one of the oldest white-collar crimes known to mankind, with bribery being the second oldest profession of mankind. According to Musoke, there are bid-rigging schemes involved in the procurement processes, which can be categorized based on the stage of bidding at which the corrupt vendor exerts its influence.

"The competitive bidding process, in which several suppliers or contractors are vying for contracts in what can be a very cutthroat environment, can be tailor made for bribery. Any advantage one vendor can gain over his competitors in this arena is extremely valuable. The benefit of "inside influence" can ensure that a vendor will win a sought-after contract. Many vendors are willing to pay for this influence" (Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2016).

In the competitive bidding process, all bidders are legally supposed to be placed on the same plane of equality, bidding according to the same terms and conditions. Each bidder competes for a contract based on the specification set forth by the purchasing company. Vendors submit confidential bids stating the price at which they will compete for a project in accordance with the

purchaser's specifications. "The way competitive bidding is rigged depends largely upon the level of influence of the corrupt employee. The more power a person has over the bidding process, the more likely the person can influence the selection of a supplier/contractor. Therefore, employees involved in bid-rigging schemes, like those in kickback schemes, tend to have a good measure of influence or access to the competitive bidding process. Potential targets for accepting bribes include buyers, contracting officials, engineers, technical representatives, quality or product assurance representatives, subcontractor liaison employees, anyone else with authority over the awarding of contracts" (Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2016).

In the pre-solicitation phase of the competitive bidding process, before bids are officially sought for a project, bribery schemes can be broken down into two distinct types. The first is the need recognition scheme, where an employee of a purchasing company is paid to convince his company that a particular project is necessary. The second reason to bribe someone in the pre-solicitation phase is to have the specifications of the contract tailored to the strength of a particular supplier (Kranacher & Riley, 2020).

In the solicitation phase of the competitive bidding process, corrupt vendors attempt to influence the selection of a contractor by restricting the pool of competitors from who bids are sought. In other words, a corrupt vendor pays an employee of the purchasing company to ensure that one or more of the vendor's competitors do not get to bid on the contract. Therefore, the corrupt vendor is able to improve his chances of winning the job. A particular type of scheme involves the sales representative who deals on behalf of a number of potential bidders. The sales representative bribes a contracting official to rig the solicitation, ensuring that only those companies represented by him get to submit bids. It is common in some sectors for buyers to require bidders to be represented by certain sales or manufacturing representatives. These representatives pay a

kickback to the buyer to protect their clients' interests. The result of this transaction is that the purchasing company is deprived of the ability to get the best price on its contract. However, the group of 'protected' vendors will not actually compete against each other for the purchaser's contracts, but rather engage in 'bid pooling', which is a process by which several bidders conspire to split contracts up and ensure that each gets a certain amount of work. With this practice, those particular bidders do not submit individual bids; instead they discuss what their bids will be so they can guarantee that each vendor will win a share of the purchasing company's business (Kranacher & Riley, 2020).

Another type of scheme used to eliminate competition in the solicitation phase is to solicit bids from fictitious suppliers. A supplier could submit quotes in the names of several different companies and could even perform work under these various names. The employee will use the quotes from several fictitious companies to demonstrate price responsiveness on the final contracts (Kranacher & Riley, 2020).

Again, in some cases, competition for a contract can be limited by severely restricting the time for submitting bids. Certain suppliers are given advance notice of contracts before bids are solicited. These suppliers are therefore able to begin preparing their bids ahead of time. With this time frame for developing bid proposals, the supplier with advance knowledge of the contract will have a decided advantage over others competitors.

In the submission phase of the procurement process, where bids are offered to the buyer, several schemes may be used to win a contract for a particular supplier. The primary or common infraction in this phase is the tempering of sealed bids. Bids are confidential documents, hence, are supposed to remain sealed until a specified date which all bids are opened and reviewed by the purchasing company in the presence of all bidders. The person or persons who have access to

sealed bids are often the target of unethical vendors seeking an advantage in the process. Employees of the purchasing company are bribed by vendors in order to obtain information on how to prepare bids, to extend the bid opening date and to ensure receipt of late submission of bid (Kranacher & Riley, 2020).

Nonetheless, when a vendor bribes an employee of the purchasing company to assist it in any way during the procurement process, the cost of the bribe is included in the corrupt vendor's bid, therefore, the purchasing company ends up bearing the cost of the illicit payment in the form of a higher contract price.

Soreide (2002) asserts that disturbing the procurement process so that one specific bidder wins the contest represents a significant challenge in public procurement. In her assertion, to reduce the risk of being caught, the illegal transactions must be hidden while it must appear as if the rules have been respected. She goes further to state that one common method in use by corrupt officials is to design the tender so that particular qualifications are requested, representing comparative advantages held by the bribing company. The protected company will thus offer the lowest price, and the contract award is defensible. Rose-Ackerman (1999) tells about “an African country that reportedly once set its telephone specifications to require equipment that could survive in a frigid climate. Only one telephone manufacturer from Scandinavia could satisfy this obviously worthless specification”.

In addition, Ferwerda (2017) opines that during the contract implementation stage, the risks of corruption are threefold. First, the procuring entity can fail to keep track records of their procurement process thereby allowing changes to the awarded contract to be made and even to go unnoticed (Porta & Vannucci, 2002). This would provide public authorities the freedom to ask for additional services to be provided on top of what was requested in the tender, but it

would also allow the winning bidder to reduce the proposed workload, the scope of the project etc. It is therefore important to investigate any changes in the scope of the project compared to the original design, as well as changes in quoted prices as compared to the original quotations (Kenny & Musatova, 2011). Second, the monitoring entity can be corrupt or negligent such that the poor performance of the contractor is not recorded or is diluted. It is therefore important to look at audit assessments and compare these with relevant media coverage of the tender (Bowles and Garoupa, 1997). Finally, cases in which audit companies reveal irregularities due to poor performance of the supplier should be considered to have a higher risk. At this point, the risks of corruption are assigned to the supplier who has to fake some of the costs it has incurred such that it can recuperate the bribe and make a profit (European Anti-Fraud Office [OLAF], 2011). Fake invoices can always be provided by phantom companies, therefore, the real existence of the subcontracting firms and of the other team members and their existence in the market is imperative.

To round up this conceptual review, the words of Alanamu (2009) will be useful. He says corruption is like a disease that can cause total pathology for an organization and can affect the economic, social, political and the moral aspect of society (Iyanda, 2012).

2.2 Theoretical Review

This section reviews various theories of corruption in an effort to describe it and its manifestations. A number of definitions have been introduced to describe corruption; however, depending upon the context and the researcher's bias, these definitions can vary. Some theorists have defined corruption by focusing on choice, reason or organizational culture.

2.2.1 Public Choice Theory

Public choices are not something made “in public”, at least not necessarily so. Nor are these choices made “by the public” in any literal sense. Literally speaking, “the public” is not a choice making entity. What renders “public choices” public are their potentially wide-ranging external effects which tend to concern the public at large. But that does not amount to the presumption that there is a specific choice making entity whose involvement would separate public from other kinds of choices. Quite to the contrary like on markets, in the realm of politics, results emerge from choices of persons (or, perhaps, agents) but are not choices made by any person (Kliemt, 2012).

James Buchanan described the foundations of the public choice perspective in his Nobel lecture delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1986. The disagreements with the mainstream view begin at the most basic level, with the assumptions about how people behave (Tresch, 2015). According to Buchanan, the mainstream theory assumes that people are essentially schizophrenic. They are self-interested in their economic lives, but when they turn to the government in their political lives, they suddenly become other-interested and consider the broader social or public interest in efficiency and equity. People do not change their stripes; they remain self-interested in their political lives as well. They turn to government only because they cannot get what they want for themselves in the marketplace, and they view the government as just another venue for seeking their own objectives (Tresch, 2015). Buchanan refers to individuals' interactions with the government as fiscal exchanges, to mirror the self-interested motivations of standard market exchanges. Using the government in the pursuit of self-interest is seen as entirely appropriate and legitimate.

According to this theory, an individual makes a limited rational choice that prompts a speculated result. The corrupt official tries to amplify his or her utility by choosing to be corrupt when his normal preferences exceed its normal evils (a blend of conceivable punishment and the chance of being exposed) (Nyambariga, 2016). Rose-Ackerman (1978) asserts that, public establishments are corrupt because advantages exceed the costs. Klitgaard (1988) also opined that, if the likelihood of being caught and the punishment are less than the advantages, then an individual becomes corrupt. In this sort of hypothesis, activities of corrupt authorities are brought on by a reasonable, cognizant and deliberate measuring procedure of a person who is expected to make pretty much rational means-end calculations. The benefit of this hypothesis is that it focuses on a particular circumstance of a specialist (a corrupt authority) who figures upsides and downsides anyway, it is insensitive to the bigger social setting for it cannot represent activating causes inside the situation. Under this model, corruption can be controlled, maximizing the expenses of corruption and curtails the benefits by making the paybacks of corruption much stiffer to stimulate by enhancing the odds of getting caught and forcing more extreme punishments. This can without much of a stretch lead to a talk requesting an extensive system of control in light of the observation, huge data gathering, evaluating and forceful authorization of a varied exhibit of unlawful and regulatory approvals (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996).

2.2.2 Bad Apple Theory

These days it is impossible to look through a newspaper or turn on a television channel or radio without being exposed to a report of unethical behaviour of one type or another in different places and scenarios. Whether the corporate giants or the cabinet of a country or in a sports event, the evil grasp of unethical behaviour has spread everywhere. Unethical behaviour reported in different forms like insider trading, cheating on taxes, insurance fraud, employee theft, illegal

siphoning of black money, academic dishonesty, athletes' use of illegal drugs, digital piracy, illegal downloading of software and digital content. Corporate names such as Enron, Tyco, Arthur Andersen, Satyam Computers etc. provide extreme examples (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).

Arshi Aadil and Avishek Roy's definition of a bad apple in an organization is a discontented, troublemaking or dishonest person, whose behaviour is likely to have a detrimental influence on the other members of the group. Most people are the product of the environment they are in; they tend to do what others do in an organization. If they perceive that the environment gives them space to act as per their will without any enforcement of ethics, they tend to seek maximum advantage of the environment and act in order to serve their individual interests.

Another factor pertaining to the creation of bad apples in an organization is 'Peer Pressure' or the 'Pressure of Authority'. Stanley Milligram's obedience to authority, experiments, supports the notion that people obey authority figures even if it means harming other individuals. The question is that can we call the people obeying authority as 'Bad Apples'? Many of them were reluctant but obeyed the authority figure and did what they were told to do. If a junior member of any financial firm is asked to manipulate the figures by his senior manager, would he simply say no or comply to his senior's advances in order to save his job? The unethical conduct in similar situations is easy to carry out and more likely to occur. The premise is that some people are morally wrong, they would always find ways to bring negative results which are harmful for others, such people are can be said to be wrong at individual level, while many others do wrong because that is what their organization asks them to do. Such people are the product of their organizational system (Aadil & Avishek, 2014).

The last category of Bad Apples is of the people who mould themselves according to the context they find themselves in. According to Janis and Mann's (1977) model of decision-making, members of groups become defensive when all decision alternatives have low probabilities for success. In the case of the bad apple, frustration is caused by an individual who behaves in dysfunctional ways, has a negative impact on personal well-being, impedes performance—and yet, due to organizational constraints on acceptable social action—cannot be easily reformed or rejected. When there's no viable way to deal with a harmful person, but members are still strongly influenced by them, the only recourse is defensive self-protection. (Will, Terence & Eliza, 2006).

The theory principally looks at the reason for an individual being corrupt. It notes that there is a causal relationship between an individual with flawed/bad behaviour and corruption (Nyambariga, 2016). It establishes that, shortcomings in human beings such as being greedy promote corruption. In most cases, morality decides the conduct of an individual and assumes to follow on the basis of good values and wrong qualities are the reason for one to be corrupt (Punch, 2000).

Most of the Bad apples in an organization tend to have certain characteristics; the following are some of those traits;

Locus of Control: People who are fatalistic, believing their life is more likely governed by chance are more prone to be Bad Apples (Adrian & Taylor, 2011). Clearly, they possess an external locus of control. Those with hostile and pessimistic attribution styles or the ones who attribute their personal failure either to external, stable and intentional causes are more prone to become counterproductive in an organizational setting (Mackey & Martinko, 2012)

Self-Evaluations: These are beliefs about self-similar to self-esteem, the people who are more likely to carry “I can do anything” attitude are the ones who are most counterproductive and turn out to be the bad apples in an organization.

Workplace Bullying: This behaviour deliberately targets an individual and aim to threaten, humiliate, undermine or victimize them. Typical acts would include physical and verbal abuse, assigning very stressful or impossible tasks to the subordinates.

Political Behaviours at work: It refers to exploitative, negative and manipulative behaviour which is self-serving and opportunistic. These traits could be found extensively in bad apples in an organization.

2.3 Empirical Review

This section presented an extensive review of some of these factors that cause corruption in relation to the study’s objectives. The section discussed the causes of corruption in public procurement.

2.3.1 Lack of Transparency and Accountability

The conduct of economic and business affairs requires observance of certain rules and regulations for activities to proceed in an orderly fashion. Rules and regulations are required to maintain a sense of fair play; to prevent disastrous conflicts; keep greed in check; minimize socially undesirable consequences; and generally, to ensure that players and referees abide by certain accepted standards of moral conduct and good behaviour. Naturally, for rules to be properly observed, they must be transparent, that is, must be set out clearly and made known in advance to all concerned, so that they can be understood and obeyed by participants in the game. Aside from being clear, rules must also be applied in an impartial manner with respect to all the key players and must be consistent and not be subject to frequent and arbitrary changes

(Myint, 2000). Therefore, where there is insufficient legal basis or political will to control, corruption flourishes resulting in a non-transparent functioning of both politics and the economy. Corruption is also affected by the extensive, non-transparent or incomplete legislation, where laws can be interpreted in many different ways (for the benefit of the one who pays).

In many countries, the lack of transparency in rules, laws, and processes creates a fertile ground for corruption. Rules are often confusing, the statutes specifying them are not publicly available, and at times, the rules are changed without properly publicized announcements. Laws or regulations are written in a way that only trained lawyers can understand and are often conceptually and linguistically opaque about important aspects thus leaving grounds for different interpretations. Processes or procedures on policy matters and other actions, as for example for competitions for public projects, are equally opaque so that, at times it is difficult to understand the process that was followed before a decision was reached (Tanzi, 1998).

The matter of accountability is necessary while considering the corruption question as it occupies an important place in this scenario. Accountability has to do with the fact that for proper observance of rules and regulations, those administering the rules must be held responsible and accountable for their actions (Myint, 2000). Due to the greater lack of existing responsible authorities and immature political institutions, accountability is withheld which gives-in to corruption in many countries around the world. A call for accountability in institutions is needed to deal with corruption in times to come, which shall see the issue in a transparent code of conduct.

2.3.2 Misuse of Discretionary Power

Discretionary powers represent another key concept in discussing corruption (Myint, 2000). The discretionary authority of public officials often represents a golden opportunity to obtain bribes. Discretionary power is at its greatest when the public demand and the public preferences are delegated to the public agent and defined during a bilateral bargaining process. Then the civil servant is choosing the private part, while price and other contract conditions are the result of the negotiation process. They arise because it is not possible to devise rules and regulations that are watertight and fool proof and will take care of all contingencies that may come up in trying to control or direct an economic activity. Hence, some flexibility and discretionary powers will have to be given to administrators in interpreting and implementing rules (Myint, 2000). Some of the discretionary powers can be bilateral negotiation of government contracts, modifications of the contract, the power of short-listing or pre-qualification or the power of invitation.

According to Sumah, 2018, the phenomenon of corruption is strongly influenced by the political and economic environment. The more the economic activity in the country is regulated and limited, the higher the authority and the power of officials in decision making and the greater the possibility of corruption, since individuals are willing to pay or offer payment in order to avoid restrictions. A great potential for corruption is especially there where the officials under the regulation are given the opportunity to decide on the basis of discretion. Dimant (2014) puts it well in his claim that the level of efficiency of public administration determines the extent to which corruption can find fertile soil and sprout and such efficiency is determined by the quality of the regulations and permits.

2.3.3 Low Remuneration

Salaries of public officials also play an important role, since it is considered one of the major incentives to become corrupt (Sumah, 2018). In other words, highly paid officials have in principle *less incentive* to indulge in corruption and have more to lose if they are caught (Chêne, 2009-U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre). This is demonstrated also by Allen, Qian & Shen (2015) in their study where they find that corruption arises because agencies, institutions and the government can no longer control corruption effectively due to underpaid officials, which is a problem especially in the developing countries, where they do not have the sufficient tax revenue to properly reward the local officials.

According to the model developed by Becker and Stigler in 1974, higher wages correspond with less corruption due to the costs of malfeasance. “Higher wages might seem fairer to the bureaucrats, making it morally harder for them to hurt their employer, the government, by accepting bribes. If a bureaucrat decides to accept bribes and gets detected, he will lose his tenure and will have to switch to the private sector. The higher the wages in the public sector compared to the private sector, the higher the expected loss from losing the job and the lower the incentives to engage in corrupt activity, provided that there is a sufficiently high level of monitoring” (Enste & Heldman, 2017). Nonetheless, Svenson (2005) states that although in principle, the salary level of civil servants affects the receipt of a bribe (the higher it is, the smaller the chance that the person will act corruptly), a higher salary also strengthens the negotiating power of the official, which leads to higher bribes. He also affirms that on the basis of existing research, it is very difficult to determine whether a higher salary causes less corruption, which means that the level of salary is not a decisive factor, but merely one of many.

However, corruption can occur at two levels, high and low. High level corruption refers to misconduct at the top and by leading politicians. Since these people are generally well-off and have a lot of privileges associated with their high office, their corrupt behaviour is not attributable to low pay and out of necessity to meet the living expenses of their families. Instead, greed is considered a main motivating factor. Also, low level corruption such as the under-hand payment that has to be made to a clerk to expedite the issue of a driving license. In this case the general perception is that civil servants with insufficient salaries to meet the living expenses of their families are driven by necessity to engage in corrupt practices. Some school of thought argue that raising their pay will mean less need to depend on illegal activities to earn a living while they have more to lose if they get caught (Myint, 2000).

2.3.4 Political Interference

Political meddling has a negative impact on contracts and tenders (Thornhill, 2008). In many countries, public procurement plays a significant role in the provision of goods and services to its citizens. Over the last few decades, emerging countries have paid close attention to public procurement. Procurement budgets in developing nations account for almost 20% of total government spending globally (Kaza et al., 2018). Many countries have begun procurement system changes to simplify and harmonize the legislative and institutional environment. Political influence in the procurement of goods and services plays a role and non-compliance to the legislative framework can lead to corrupt practices (Magakwe, 2022).

The ruling party of many countries is ultimately responsible for the development and implementation of policies and set the agenda for political direction (Somasundaram & Damsgaard, 2005). This is usually demonstrated by rigorously implementing the legislative framework and procurement policies in all government purchases, any tampering in awarding

government projects can be reduced. The usage of technology during the procurement processes such as e-Procurement acts as a 'barrier' to a greater range of intervention by entrenched interests. As a result, the awarding of government contracts adheres to core principles of government procurement (Magakwe, 2022).

2.4 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework was designed to describe how corruption influences public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority. It was developed based on the review of various concepts, theories or literatures used for the study. In figure 1 below, corruption serves as the independent variable (the causative variable/the variable which can be manipulated) while public procurement procedures/phases are dependent variables (the effect/outcome variable or the variable being measured). Poor remuneration and lack of transparency influenced/moderated the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (this variable affects the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables). In other words, if there will be an increase in the prevalence of undue influence during the solicitation phase, it can be because procurement officials are not properly paid, therefore making them open or susceptible to receive bribes from tenderers.




Figure 2.0: Conceptual Framework

2.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter is an expansion of the information presented in chapter one, by providing a comprehensive review of literatures related to the identified problem, which have been published by a myriad of researchers, anti-corruption agencies, diplomatic missions/embassies etc. Under the conceptual review, various researchers including Mulinde Musoke described how corruption is practiced in the phases of public procurement. That is, the pre-solicitation phase, where an employee of a purchasing company is paid to convince his company that a particular project is necessary and also to have the specifications of the contract tailored to the strength of that particular supplier. The second phase is the solicitation phase, where corrupt vendors attempt to influence the selection of a contractor by restricting the pool of competitors from who bids are sought. Finally, there is the submission phase, where bids are offered to the buyer with the aid of the employees who are bribed by vendors in order to temper with sealed bids.

Also, this chapter contained two major theories introduced by researchers, as a way of describing the manifestations of corruption. The first theory discussed is the public choice theory, which states that an individual makes a (limited) rational choice that prompts a speculated result. Rose-

Ackerman (1978) asserts that, public establishments are corrupt because advantages exceed the costs. Another theory discussed is the bad apple theory, which states that most people are the product of the environment they are in; they tend to do what others do in an organization. This chapter concluded with a conceptual framework, which was developed based on the review of various concepts, theories or literatures used for the study.



CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

A research methodology is a systematic method to resolve a research problem through data gathering using various techniques, providing an interpretation of data gathered and drawing conclusions about the research data. In other words, it is the blueprint of a research or study (Murthy & Bhojanna, 2009). This chapter describes how the research was conducted. It explicitly defines and details the research design, the population and sampling technique, research instrument and the strategy for collecting data. Also, it informs scholars and practitioners regarding the rigor and the appropriateness of the methodology.

3.1 Research Design

The research design gives the general plan of how a researcher will go about answering the research questions set (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2011). Additionally, it comprises of two main functions; the first is to identify and develop procedures and logistical arrangements required to undertake a study, and the second is to emphasize the importance of quality in these procedures to ensure their validity, objectivity and accuracy (Kumar, 2005). McCombes (2019) also described research design as a strategy or plan to answer a set of questions, meaning, it describes how the researcher will investigate the central problem of the research.

The features of a research design influence the type of data to be gathered and, subsequently, its results. Depending on the type, research design also defines all other constituent parts of a study, such as variables, hypotheses, experiments, methodology, and statistical analysis (Creswell et al., 2018).

This study adopted a descriptive research design to identify, analyse and describe the influence of corruption in public procurement procedures in the Ghana Highways Authority. The design provides relationships, experience or processes accruing in a particular instance (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). It is concerned with conditions or relationships that exist, practices that prevail, beliefs, point of view, or attitudes that are held, processes that are going on, effects that are being felt or trends that are developing (Manoharan, 2009).

The good thing about this research design is that it is relatively quick and easy to conduct and it is able to measure prevalence for all factors under investigation and very good for generating hypothesis (Barratt & Kirwan, 2009). However, Leedy (1985) argues that descriptive research design sometimes contains errors and it is subjective, thus, when using questionnaires, questions are predetermined and prescriptive and the researcher may choose to listen to only what he or she wants to hear which makes it difficult to overcome bias.

3.2 Research Approach

In addition, this research study employed quantitative approach to collect data which was measured in numerical figures. This approach is often used by researchers who follow the scientific paradigm (Haq, 2014). This method seeks to quantify data and generalize results from a sample of a target population (Macdonald et al., 2008). It follows structured data collection methods and processes with data output in the form of numbers. Quantitative research also observes objective analysis using statistical means (Macdonald et al., 2008).

3.3 Population

Population involves all members of any well-defined class of people, events or objects about which a generalization is made, whereas a sample is a portion of the population or a small group

that is observed in a research study (Manoharan, 2009). Census is used when your research question requires, or when you have access to, data from every member of the population. Usually, it is only straightforward to collect data from a whole population when it is small, accessible and cooperative. For larger and more dispersed populations, it is often difficult or impossible to collect data from every individual. The population of this study comprised all parties involved in procurement procedures (i.e. procurement, finance, audit, administration and other departments) in the cooperate office of Ghana Highway Authority, since that is where all procurement procedures take place. Based on the data received from the cooperate office, an estimated 122 employees were targeted for the study. Thus, the population comprised 122 employees of Ghana Highway Authority.

3.4 Sample and Sampling Technique

According to Ravikiran (2023), a sample can be said to be an unbiased subset of the population that best represents the whole data. He further explained that to overcome the constraints of a population, you can sometimes collect data from a subset of your population and then consider it as the general norm. You collect the subset information from the groups who have taken part in the study, making the data reliable. The results obtained for different groups who took part in the study can be extrapolated to generalize for the population.

The study was conducted at the cooperate office of Ghana Highway Authority in Accra. The study scientifically used a sample to represent the entire population due to time constraint coupled with difficulties associated with gathering data from a larger group. Using the Cohen's (2006) sample determination table, the study sampled 40 respondents from the target population of 122.

The sampled respondents were then obtained using the simple random sampling technique. This was done in order to give the respondents equal chance of being selected for the study, that is, minimizing bias and ensuring data gathered are of high quality.

3.5 Sources of Data

Data was obtained from both primary and secondary sources.

3.5.1 Primary Source

Primary data is first-hand data collected through observation, interviews, as well as questionnaires. A primary source is anything that gives you direct evidence about the people, events, or phenomena that you are researching. Primary sources will usually be the main objects of your analysis. If you are researching the past, you cannot directly access it yourself, so you need primary sources that were produced at the time by participants or witnesses (e.g. letters, photographs, newspapers). If you are researching something current, your primary sources can either be qualitative or quantitative data that you collect yourself (e.g. through interviews, surveys, experiments) or sources produced by people directly involved in the topic, for example official documents or media texts (Streefkerk, 2018). For this study, the source of primary data to the research questions and objectives was questionnaire.

3.5.2 Secondary Source

A secondary source is anything that describes, interprets, evaluates, or analyses information from primary sources. When you cite a secondary source, it's usually not to analyse it directly. Instead, you'll probably test its arguments against new evidence or use its ideas to help formulate your own.

This source of data for this study involved documents from procurement institutions like public procurement authority, chartered institute of procurement and supply (CIPS) etc., public procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), library, international journals available online and other related data.

3.6 Data Collection Instrument

Data collection allows us to collect information that we want to collect about our study participants. Accurate and systematic data collection is critical to conducting scientific research (Abawi, 2017). Questionnaires were utilized as the data collection instrument for this study. According to Kumar (2005), a questionnaire is a written list of questions, the answers to which are recorded by the respondents. This instrument was utilized because it is accurate, convenient to use, inexpensive and provides anonymity for the respondents especially in the public sector where information is highly sensitive and confidential. Questionnaires allow collection of both subjective and objective data in a large sample of the study population in order to obtain results that are statistically significant, especially when resources are limited (Abawi, 2017).

Research information is usually sought about people's beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and characteristics therefore; a questionnaire is suitable because it is structured to suit specific types of information sought by a researcher (Gatara, 2010). The questionnaire was divided into three sections. Section A consisted of demographic information of the respondents such as age, gender, length of service and many more. Section B involved a set of questions on the factors contributing to corruption in public procurement procedures while section C focused on some corrupt practices and their impact in public procurement procedures.

3.7 Data Collection Procedure

From the initial stage of collecting data, a letter of introduction was sent to the head office of Ghana Highway Authority to introduce the researcher. After permission had been sought and granted, the questionnaires were sent personally by the researcher to the respondents. The elements of the questionnaires were explained to the respondents, the researchers then gave them some time to complete the questionnaires.

3.8 Data Analysis

According to Shamoo and Resnik (2003) various analytic procedures “provide a way of drawing inductive inferences from data and distinguishing the signal (the phenomenon of interest) from the noise (statistical fluctuations) present in the data”. An essential component of ensuring data integrity is the accurate and appropriate analysis of research findings. Improper statistical analyses distort scientific findings mislead casual readers (Shepard, 2002).

Once data is collected, cleaned, and processed, it is ready for analysis. As you manipulate data, you may find you have the exact information you need, or you might need to collect more data. During this phase, data analysis tools and software help to understand, interpret, and derive conclusions based on the requirements. Data analysis tools make it easier for users to process and manipulate data, analyze the relationships and correlations between data sets, and it also helps to identify patterns and trends for interpretation (Johnson, 2023). Data was entered in SPSS (Statistical Product for Social Sciences) software and several techniques which are offered by the software were used to come up with clear results.

Descriptive statistics was used to analyze the data in the form of frequencies and percentages. Descriptive statistics are brief informational coefficients that summarize a given data set, which can be either a representation of the entire population or a sample of a population. In simple

terms, descriptive statistics help describe and understand the features of a specific data set by giving short summaries about the sample and measures of the data (Hayes, 2023).

3.9 Ethical Considerations

According to Brett Anthony Hayward (2005), the problem of persuading participants to cooperate with the researcher during data collection exists in research. Bless & Higson-Smith (2000) generally accepts the ethical rights of a participant to be: the right to privacy and voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality.

Participation in research often disrupts the subject's regular activities (Babbie & Mouton, 2001) and can possibly invade the person's privacy (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000). Participation in research must be voluntary and participants must have the option to refuse to divulge certain information about them. Research often requires participants to reveal personal information that may be unknown to their friends and associates (Babbie & Mouton, 2001).

However, a lot of people are prepared to divulge this information of a very private nature on condition that their names are not revealed (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000). The researcher cannot generalize the sample survey findings to an entire population unless a substantial majority of the selected sample actually participates (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). Under this study, it was agreed that the collected data would be used solely for the purpose of the research, and should the researcher wish to publish the findings, the organization would be consulted, also, that no information would be made public without their prior consent, and after they have been provided with the opportunity to view the findings of this research.

An imperative concern in research is the protection of the respondents' interests and wellbeing through the protection of their identity. If revealing their survey responses would injure them in

any way, adherence to this norm becomes all the more important. A respondent may be considered anonymous when the researcher cannot identify a given response with a given respondent (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The consideration of anonymity can be easily overcome by omitting the names of the participants or identifying the respondents by a code instead of by name (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000).

Another essential ethical consideration is confidentiality. The respondents must be assured that the data would only be used for the stated purposes of the research and that no other person would have access to them (Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000). The respondents of this study were assured that their responses would not be used for any other purpose and if there should be the need for other purpose they would be informed first.

3.10 Chapter Summary

This section describes how the research was actually conducted. It explicitly defines and details the research design, the population and sampling technique, research instrument and the strategy for collecting data. Also, it informs scholars and practitioners regarding the rigor and the appropriateness of the methodology in relation to the scholarly community in which the research belongs. This study adopted a descriptive research design to identify, analyse and describe the influence of corruption in public procurement procedures in Ghana Highway Authority. In addition, this study employed quantitative approach to collect data which was measured in numerical figures. This method seeks to quantify data and generalize results from a sample of a target population (Macdonald et al., 2008).

The study was conducted at the head office of Ghana Highway Authority in Accra. The target population was 122 employees, out of which 40 were sampled using Cohen's (2006) sample

determination table. A simple random sampling technique was used to select the respondents and questionnaires were administered to them. Once data is collected, cleaned, and processed, it is ready for analysis. Data was entered in SPSS (Statistical Product for Social Sciences) software and several techniques which are offered by the program were used to come up with clear results.



CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and analysis of the study on corruption in public procurement Ghana Highway Authority. The data was collected exclusively from questionnaires as the research instrument.

4.1 Response Rate

A total of forty (40) questionnaires were distributed among the confirmed, full-time employees in the head office of Ghana Highway Authority, in collecting data. From the survey data, thirty-three (33) out of forty (40) sampled respondents filled in and returned the questionnaires, contributing to 82.5% of response rate. This response rate was made a reality after the researcher made repeated personal visits to remind the respondent to fill-in and return the questionnaires. In addition, due to the sensitivity and issues surrounding the topic, some respondents were reluctant to participate in the survey.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Responded	33	82.5
Not Responded	7	17.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Field Survey (2023)

4.2 Demographics of Respondents

This section provides information about the demographic information of the respondents who participated in the study. The characteristics of these respondents were descriptively measured with frequency and percentage. The findings are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Demographic Information of Respondents

Demographics	Frequency	Percentage
Gender:		
Male	18	54.5
Female	15	45.5
Total	33	100.0
Length of Service:		
Below 3 years	3	9.1
3-5 years	11	33.3
6-10 years	13	39.4
Above 10 years	6	18.2
Total	33	100.0
Age:		
25 and below	2	6.1
26-35 years	16	48.5
36-45 years	9	27.3
46-55 years	6	18.2
56-60 years	0	0.0
Total	33	100.0
Work Unit:		
Procurement	5	15.2
Audit	7	21.2
Administration	13	39.4
Account/Finance	8	24.2
Total	33	100.0
Level of Education:		
Diploma	9	27.3
Bachelor	19	57.6
Masters	5	15.2
PhD	0	0.0
Total	33	100.0

Source: Field Survey (2023)

Table 4.2 presented information about the demographic characteristics of the surveyed respondents. It was discovered that majority of the respondents (54.5%) were males whilst the remaining 45.5% were females. Although most of the respondents were male, females were

fairly represented, which means there was no gender bias with respect to this study and the organization also values diversity in the workplace.

Furthermore, regarding the age range of the respondents, it was found that most respondents were aged between 26-35 years (48.5%). 27.3% were within the 36-45 years category. Also, the remaining, 6.1% and 18.2% were below 25 years and between 46 to 55 years respectively. The age structure of the respondents was relatively youthful, which means that they are abreast with current corruption issues in public procurement and can provide the information needed.

On the level of education of respondents, most of the respondents had a first degree as their most recent educational qualification (57.6%), followed by those with diploma (27.3%). Five respondents, representing 15.2% of the respondents had master's degree. The respondents' educational background shows a high level of knowledge about the procurement procedures of the organization, therefore, might be aware of the prevalent corrupt practices in the public procurement proceedings. It was discovered that most respondents have 6-10 years of working experience, representing 39.4% of the respondents, 33.3% who have between three to five years of working experience. Also, the study revealed that 18.2% have worked above 10 years. Three respondents have less than three years of working experience. This implies that they have high level of professionalism within the institution, which is expected to be observed in its operations, including public procurement procedures.

Again, 5 respondents belong to the procurement unit, representing 15.2%, 7 respondents are in the audit department, representing 21.2%, 13 respondents representing 39.4% are in the administration department and followed by 8 of them who work in the account/finance department. This data indicates that there are proper structures within the organization, with each

employee performing specific roles, therefore were able to express their views and opinions about the topic.

4.3 Perceptions on the Forms of corruption

This section of the questionnaire aims to unravel some major corrupt practices and how they affect procurement in Ghana Highway Authority. This is in line with the first specific objective of the study.

Table 4.3: *Forms of Corruption*

Indicators	Mean	Standard Deviation
Collusion	1.21	.415
Undue Influence	1.94	1.870
Conflict of Interest	1.58	.502

Source: Field Survey (2023)

The findings showed that collusion, conflict of interest and undue influence are some of the forms of corruption in public procurement procedures in Ghana Highway Authority. They recorded mean values of 1.21, 1.58 and 1.94 respectively, with standard deviation of 0.415, 0.502 and 1.870 respectively, which indicates that the data points are gathered closely around the mean values. The mean value of 1.94 implies that undue influence is a major form of corruption in Ghana Highway Authority, followed by conflict of interest and collusion by public officers in the award of contracts in favour of some firms.

4.4 Perceptions on the Causes of Corruption in Public Procurement

This section of the questionnaire aims to understand the factors that contribute or fuel corruption in public procurement procedures. This is in line with the second specific research objective.

Table 4.4: Causes of Corruption

Indicators	Mean	Standard Deviation
The level of salaries in the public sector	4.24	.936
Contribution of perceived low salaries to corruption	1.24	.435
Transparency of procurement processes	1.73	.452

Source: Field Survey (2023)

The findings revealed that respondents agreed that the level of salaries of public sector workers is very low. It recorded a mean value of 4.24, with standard deviation of 0.936, which indicates that the data points are gathered closely around the mean values. Therefore, this data confirms that the level of salaries paid to public officers in Ghana is very low.

Again, the findings showed that low salaries and lack of transparency enhance corruption in public procurement. They recorded mean values of 1.24 and 1.73 respectively, with standard deviation of 0.435 and 0.452 respectively, which indicates that the data points are gathered closely around the mean values. However, the standard deviation of 0.435 indicates that low remuneration enhances corruption more than lack of transparency in public procurement proceedings.

Furthermore, the results of the questionnaires prepared and distributed suggest that the causes of corruption in public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority are low remuneration and lack of

transparency. From table 4.4, it is evident that the lack of transparency in procurement processes creates a fertile ground for corruption. Processes or procedures on policy matters and other actions, for example, competition for public projects, are opaque so that, at times it is difficult to understand the process that was followed before a decision was reached (Tanzi, 1998).

4.5 Effects of Corruption on Procurement

The study further examined the effect of procurement irregularities on public procurement procedures in Ghana Highway Authority. This is in line with the third specific objective of the study. Since regression analysis was conducted to that effect, variables were formed through data transformation process for all the constructs in SPSS software so as to warrant the configuration of the regression model. Effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables was measured by the R-square value, which has been regarded as the most common effect size measure in path models (Garson, 2016). To this effect, tentative cut-off points have been recommended (Hock & Ringle, 2006; Garson, 2016). The prescribed tentative cut-off points for describing R-square are as follows: Results above 0.67 are described as being “Substantial”, those above 0.33 are “moderate” and those above 0.19 are “weak”. The actual findings relating to the regression results are presented as follows.

Table 4.5: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted Square	R Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.833 ^a	.695	.685	.640

a. Predictors: (Constant), Undue Influence, Collusion and Conflict of Interest

b. Dependent Variable: Public procurement processes

Source: Field Survey (2023)

The findings in Table 4.5 first of all indicates that there was a strong positive correlation between the predictors (Undue Influence, Collusion and Conflict of Interest) and public procurement processes ($r=0.833$). The interpretation of the correlation result was based on the cut-offs indicated by Cohen (1988) for its interpretation. This relationship however is a joint one between the predictors on one hand and the dependent variable considered in the model.

In order to assess the effect of procurement irregularities on public procurement procedures, one has to consider the r-square which measures the coefficient of determination. The r-square results therefore show that procurement irregularities, as measured by undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest collectively accounted for 69.5% positive variance in procurement processes of Ghana Highway Authority ($R\text{-square}=0.695$) when the effect of other factors are statistically controlled. Furthermore, other factors not captured in the model could account for only 30.5% positive variance in procurement processes when the effect of procurement irregularities is statistically controlled.

Conclusively, it is established that procurement irregularities like undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest cause substantial inefficiencies in public procurement processes in Ghana Highway Authority. It is managerially prudent for Ghana Highway Authority to ensure it executes its procurement practices on procurement principles efficiently so as to avoid any inefficiency during its procurement processes.

Table 4.6: Correlation between Variables

		Irregularities	Effects on Procurement	Perceived Remuneration	Transparency of Procurement
Irregularities	Pearson Cor.	1	.833**	-.239	-.121
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.180	.503
	N	33	33	33	33
Effects on Procurement	Pearson Cor.	.833**	1	-.082	-.055
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.649	.761
	N	33	33	33	33
Perceived Remuneration	Pearson Cor.	-.239	-.082	1	.029
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.180	.649		.873
	N	33	33	33	33
Transparency of Procurement	Pearson Cor.	-.121	-.055	.029	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.503	.761	.873	
	N	33	33	33	33

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Source: Field Survey (2023)

In addition, Table 4.6 shows a correlation between the variables for the research. Corrupt practices had a correlation of 0.833, $p < 0.01$ with the effects on procurement, and had a correlation of -0.239, $p > 0.01$ and -0.121, $p > 0.01$ with perceived low remuneration and transparency of procurement respectively. The results presuppose that there is a positive correlation between corrupt practices and the effects on procurement. Also, the relationship between the variables is statistically significant (p-value of 0.000). In addition, the regression analysis from table 4.6 shows that corrupt practices, as measured by undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest collectively accounted for 69.5% positive variance in procurement processes of Ghana Highway Authority ($R\text{-square}=0.695$), meaning that corrupt practices affect the various phases/procedures of public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority. Again, it is worth noting that, the correlation and regression values between corrupt practices and the effects on procurement is higher, indicating that these forms of corrupt practices have been accepted as a normal phenomenon rather than an act perpetuated by a few people in public procurement procedures of Ghana Highway Authority.

4.6 Discussion of Results

This section discusses each of the objectives based on the findings and also in comparison with existing studies.

Specifically, the first objective of the study was to *identify perceived corrupt practices that take place in public procurement, in Ghana Highway Authority*. The findings of the first objective lead to the conclusion that, the corrupt practices that take place during public procurement processes in Ghana Highway Authority are undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest. This finding is consistent with existing literature which also finds “greasing the wheels of business” and the existence of “agents” that serve as liaison with decision-makers, as some corrupt insidious acts. As the old saying goes, it’s not what you know but who you know, or, as blogger Danny Ferguson put it, it's not what you don't know; it's who your college roommate knows. Cronyism occurs within a network of insiders who confer favours on one another.

With regards to the second research objective, thus, to *identify the causes of corruption in public procurement processes in Ghana Highway Authority*, the study concludes that, low salaries together with lack of transparency fuels corruption in public procurement processes of Ghana Highway Authority. As such, making the procurement process about who is able to grease the palms of public officers and not by merit. Also, this result supports previous empirical studies that indicates that, salaries of public officials also play an important role, since it is considered one of the major incentives to become corrupt (Sumah, 2018) and employees of the purchasing company are bribed by vendors in order to obtain information on how to prepare bids, to extend the bid opening date and to ensure receipt of late submission of bid (Kranacher & Riley, 2020). Processes or procedures on policy matters and other actions, as for example for competitions

for public projects, are equally opaque so that, at times it is difficult to understand the process that was followed before a decision was reached” (Tanzi, 1998).

Finally, from the third objective, that is, *to ascertain the effect of corruption in public procurement processes in Ghana Highway Authority*, it can be concluded that, there is a strong positive correlation between the identified forms of corruption, that is, undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest, and public procurement processes ($r=0.833$).

In other words, it has been established that these corrupt acts have a substantial impact or contribution to the procurement processes, which further strengthens inefficiencies like increased contract value, poor quality and delays in contract execution. Empirical studies affirm this finding with the view that, the negative economic and social costs of corrupt actions, in terms of wasted resources, inefficiency and missed opportunities, are always higher than the benefits that could be obtained through such actions (Tanzi, 1998).

4.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the results and discussion of the study’s data in relation to the objectives. The chapter also presented the demographic features of the respondents (Ghana Highway Authority, Accra). In addition, the chapter presented discussion on the effect of corruption on the public procurement processes of Ghana Highway Authority. The next chapter presents the study’s summary, conclusion and recommendation.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter specifically presented information regarding the summary of key findings; conclusions drawn in respect of the specific objectives as well as recommendations offered. It finally presented information regarding suggestions for further studies given cognizance to findings obtained from the study.

5.1 Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine the effect or impact of corruption in public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority (GHA). Specifically, the study sought to identify corrupt practices that take place in public procurement, ascertain causes of corruption in public procurement and also find out the effects of these corrupt acts in public procurement in Ghana Highway Authority. This study utilized a descriptive survey design with its target population consisting of employees from Ghana Highway Authority. Using convenience sampling design, the researcher selected 40 respondents (33 responded) on whom the survey was conducted and the data was analysed using quantitative technique. Questionnaires were used in collecting primary data and analysed using SPSS and presented in tables for clear visualization.

The study found that collusion, conflict of interest and undue influence are some of the forms of corruption in public procurement procedures in Ghana Highway Authority. They recorded high mean values of 1.21, 1.58 and 1.94 respectively, with standard deviation of 0.415, 0.502 and 1.870 respectively, which indicates that the data points are gathered closely around the mean values.

Again, the study established that low salaries and lack of transparency enhance corruption in public procurement. They recorded mean values of 1.24 and 1.73 respectively, with standard deviation of 0.435 and 0.452 respectively, which indicates that the data points are gathered closely around the mean values.


Additionally, it was found that there was a strong positive correlation between the identified forms of corruption, that is, undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest, and Public procurement processes ($r=0.833$). The r-square results revealed that procurement irregularities, as measured by undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest collectively accounted for 69.5% positive variance in procurement processes of Ghana Highway Authority ($R\text{-square}=0.695$). Overall, it was revealed that these corrupt practices, i.e. undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest, influences public procurement procedures in the form of procurement inefficiencies like increased cost, poor quality and delays in delivery or executing contracts.

5.2 Conclusion

The results presented indicates that there are corrupt practices perpetuated in the public procurement process of Ghana Highway Authority, with these acts having substantial impact on the process and making it inefficient. Public procurement is guided by principles, laws and regulations which make the processes more efficient. Therefore, anytime there is a compromise it will be impossible to achieve the objectives of value for money, accountability and cost savings. The findings presuppose that, in Ghana Highway Authority, public officials allow some tenderers to have undue influence of the procurement process; they are involved in conflict of interest and collusion. All these corrupt acts greatly impact the public procurement process, flooding it with inefficiencies like poor quality and delayed delivery of goods, works and

services. These findings are in support of some empirical studies or reports that held the view that corruption influences public procurement procedures. For example, data from the Auditor General's report on audit of COVID-19 transactions for the period March 2020 to June 2022 revealed a lot of corrupt practices in the procurement of vaccines for the country. These acts led to delays in the supply and bloating of contract value.

However, the findings also presuppose that low remuneration does not necessarily enhance corruption in public procurement processes, as it is perceived. According to Myint (2000), high level corruption refers to misconduct at the top and by leading politicians. Since these people are generally well-off and have a lot of privileges associated with their high office, their corrupt behaviour is not attributable to low pay and out of necessity to meet the living expenses of their families. Instead, greed is considered a main motivating factor. This empirical study supports the school of thought that low level of remuneration does not encourage corruption among public officials involved in procurement.



5.3 Recommendations

Based on the research findings and conclusions made, the following recommendations are hereby proposed. The study recommends that, since corrupt practices, i.e., undue influence, collusion and conflict of interest has a positive effect on public procurement procedures, management of Ghana Highway Authority should introduce random transfer or rotation of staff, especially those involved in procurement proceedings of the organization. When people involved in sensitivity positions are allowed to work within that unit for long, they become quite powerful/influential and later tend to create a particular organizational culture which will end up becoming normal, given the fact that, “familiarity breeds contempt”. This will help tackle corrupt acts between public officers and tenderers since the tenderers will no more have “insiders” to

influence the procurement process or release confidential information to them. The random transfers or rotation will bring random changes to the ways in which procurement is done in the organization, which will serve as unproductive grounds to encourage corruption.

Also, considering the colossal impact of corruption in public procurement and the fact that it involves the use of public funds, there should be public prosecution of public procurement offenders. This public prosecution as in the case of A.B. Adjei (former PPA chief executive officer), will serve as warning to public procurement officers who may be involved in corrupt acts. It is a known fact that there are only few prosecutions done by the Attorney General or Special Prosecutor after procurement irregularities have been unravelled by the Accountant General. This lackadaisical approach towards prosecution of offenders is also an incentive for people to continue with the corrupt acts, due to the fact that they will not be held liable. Assuming Manasseh Azure (the award winning Ghanaian journalist) did not conduct this investigation about corruption on the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), A.B. Adjei will still be at post, engaging in all sorts of corrupt acts with his cronies.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Since the findings of the study predicted a strong positive correlation between the identified forms of corruption and public procurement processes in Ghana Highway Authority, it is recommended that similar studies should be conducted to include public institutions within the country at large. Furthermore, the study focused only on the head office of Ghana Highway Authority located in Accra, hence further studies can be conducted in offices outside Accra. Again, it is recommended that future studies can focus on conducting an in-depth study on the causes or drivers of corruption in public procurement, in order to make recommendations for policy making.

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**APPENDIX
UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA**

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

DEPARTMENT OF PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

TOPIC: An Investigation into Corruption in Public Procurement in Ghana: A Case of Ghana Highway

Authority.

QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

a. Gender:

Male Female

b. Age:

25 and below 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-60

c. Length of service in the public service:


Below 3 years 3-5 years 6-10years above 10 years

d. What is your department?

Procurement Audit Administration Account/Finance

e. What is your highest level of education?

Diploma Bachelor Masters PhD



SECTION B:

1. How would you rate the level of salaries paid to public officers in Ghana?

Very High High

Neutral Very Low

Low

2. Do you think that perceived low remuneration levels in the public service contribute to corruption in the public procurement in Ghana?

Yes No

3. In your opinion, to what extent does the low levels of remuneration of public officers contribute to corruption in public procurement in Ghana?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent

4. Do you think that senior public servants in your organization put pressure on junior public officers involved in the public procurement process (bid evaluation)?

Yes No

5. To what extent do senior public officers exert pressure on the junior officers involved in the public procurement process?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent


6. Do you think that the public procurement procedure in this organization is transparent?

Yes No

7. To what extent is the public procurement procedure practiced here transparent?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent



SECTION C:

8. What is your view on corruption?

Bad Good

9. What forms of corruption in Public Procurement are you aware of?

Bribery Undue Influence Kickbacks Fictitious Vendors Others


10. Do you think that persons involved in the public procurement process collude in the award of contracts?

Yes No

11. If yes, to what extent would you say that persons involved in the public procurement process collude to influence the award of contracts?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent



12. Do public officers influence the preparation of tender documents in favor of some firms?

Yes No

13. If yes, to what extent?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent

14. In your opinion, do officers award contracts to firms they have interest in during evaluation stage of tender documents.

Yes No

15. If yes, to what extent?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent


16. Do firms owned by public procurement practitioners also participate in the process?

Yes No

17. If yes, to what extent?

Very High Extent High Extent

Very Low Extent Low Extent



18. In the last one year, were there any procurement undertaken?

Yes No

19. If yes, which ones?

Road works Cleaning Services Stationery Consultancy others.....

20. In the procurement undertaken, were there any irregularities detected?

Yes No

21. If yes, how was it handled?

Reported to authorities Rejected/cancelled the contract Did nothing

22. What was the effect of these irregularities on quality of the product/services?

Increased cost of service Poor quality of service Delayed provision of service

others.....

